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#2A-6/7/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION LOCAL 65, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
CASE NO. C-3 383 
-and-
VILLAGE OF DRYDEN, 
Employer. 
JAMES N. MC CAULEY, for Petitioner 
HARRIS, BEACH & WILCOX (PETER J. SPINELLI, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Village of 
Dryden (Village) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) which, inter 
alia, found the Village's part-time police officers to be covered 
employees. The petitioner, Union Local 65, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America (IBT) has filed a response in opposition to the Village's 
exceptions. 
The Director rejected the Village's argument that its six 
part-time police officers were noncovered casuals, finding that 
the employment characteristics of their year-round positions 
evidenced regular and continuous employment. The Village argues 
Board - C-3383 -2 
that the Director erred in multiple respects in concluding that 
the part-time officers were covered employees. 
Several of the Village's exceptions relate to the Director's 
use of employment records for the first quarter of 1988-89. The 
Vl^Brage^ 
and, in any event, that the information for the first quarter of 
1988-89 is not a reliable indication of the hours which might be 
worked later that year. 
Regarding the employment records considered by the Director, 
evidence which is otherwise relevant to the disposition of a 
representation question is not to be rejected simply because it 
is developed after a petition is filed. The Act's application to 
a group of putative employees is central to the administration of 
the Act and all evidence which bears upon that issue is 
necessarily and properly considered. 
As to the reliability of the information, no challenge is 
made to the data itself, only to the conclusions which can be 
properly drawn therefrom. The evidence before the Director shows 
that the part-time police officers worked, on monthly average per 
position, 13.3 hours in 1986-87, 21.3 hours in 1987-88 and 35 
hours for the first quarter of 1988-89. Whether this be 
denominated a "sharply upward trend", as characterized by the 
Director, is largely immaterial. The statistics themselves, 
which are not in dispute, establish that the part-time officers, 
as a group, currently hold regular and continuous employment. 
Contrary to the Village's allegation, the Director did not make 
"1 Board - C-3383 
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any predictions regarding the future composition or structure of 
part-time police work. 
In reaching the determination that the part-time officers 
hold regular and continuous employment, the Director correctly 
~--—=-^ —^=^-derel"ine 
Village itself concedes, the part-time officers are not 
seasonals. No matter how else one may characterize their 
employment, the Director properly recognized that the number of 
hours worked is but one of several factors to be considered in 
assessing the regularity and continuity of the employees• 
employment relationship. 
) 
The Village's remaining exceptions claim that the Director 
erred in considering several other factors relevant to a 
determination regarding the employees1 coverage. We find, in 
agreement with the Director, that the Village does have 
expectations, however minimal, regarding the acceptable number of 
hours to be worked by the part-time officers, the performance of 
work as scheduled, and the steps necessary to ensure that its 
expectations are satisfied. The record further establishes that 
the Village has fully integrated its part-time and full-time 
police force to the point where the part-time officers are 
primarily responsible for the delivery of the Village's police 
services. 
VState of New York, 5 PERB 153022 and 3039 (1972). 
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Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Director 
is affirmed, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the most 
appropriate unit is as follows: 
Included: All full-time and part-time police officers 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an election by secret ballot 
shall be held under the Director's supervision among the 
employees in the above unit, unless IBT submits, within 30 
days of its receipt of this decision and order, evidence 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the 
Board's Rules of Procedure for certification without an 
election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Village shall submit to 
the Director and to IBT, within 30 days of receipt of this 
decision and order, an alphabetized list of all employees 
within said unit on the payroll date immediately preceding 
the date of this decision. 
DATED: June 7, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
\, Member Walter L. Eisenberg, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
and _ GAS.E-N.Or.-U--9J25^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS), 
Respondent. 
MARK BERBERIAN, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (MARIE D. DUKES, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the State 
of New York (Division of Human Rights) (Division) to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found that the 
Division violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it reassigned 
Rosamond Prosterman to a different unit within the Legal 
Bureau of the Division in retaliation for her protected 
activities as an officer and representative of her bargaining 
agent, the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). 
In summary, the ALJ found that Prosterman, an attorney 
then having 19 years of service with the Division, was 
reassigned from the Appeals and Litigation Unit to the 
i 
y 
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Administrative Hearings Unit of the Legal Bureau on the 
afternoon of October 14, 1986, effective the following day, 
by the Division's General Counsel, Margarita Rosa. The ALJ 
further found that Prosterman had engaged in representation 
--actav-i-ty—on—behajr-f— of=PEE=^for— some~peri-od=of~t j ;me=prdor=to r=r_-^ =—-—_ 
the reassignment, and that in her representative capacity at 
two particular labor-management meetings (May 13 and October 
7, 1986) she expressed heated vocal opposition to certain 
staffing decisions made by the General Counsel, which, 
Prosterman contended, inappropriately interfered with the 
maintenance of career ladders for attorneys in the Division. 
The ALJ concluded that it was Prosterman's engagement in such 
protected activity which prompted the General Counsel to 
select her for reassignment to the Administrative Hearings 
Unit when a need arose for such reassignment. The ALJ 
rejected the claim by the Division that the reassignment was 
based on nothing more than operational need and a 
determination by Rosa that Prosterman was the best suited 
attorney in the Bureau to meet the need. In so finding, the 
ALJ determined that the Administrative Hearings Unit is a 
less favorable assignment than the Appeals and Litigation 
Unit, that a pattern of placing newly hired (as compared to 
experienced) attorneys in the Administrative Hearing Unit had 
been established, that involuntary reassignment of an 
Board - U-9257 
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attorney from the Appeals and Litigation Unit to the 
Administrative Hearings Unit was unprecedented, and that the 
precipitousness of the reassignment was unjustified by 
operational need, particularly in light of the subsequent 
^^ ==r=j=:d-etea3m±natdon—t^ ^ — 
Appeals and Litigation Unit matter, to the exclusion of 
Administrative Hearings, for a period of more than two months 
after the reassignment took place. 
In its exceptions, the Division asserts, among other 
things, that the ALJ improperly shifted the burden of proof 
to it when she evidently relied upon the failure by Rosa to 
disclaim knowledge of the heated remarks made by Prosterman 
) 
on October 7, 1986, one week prior to the reassignment, about 
Rosa's staffing/career ladder decisions, as a basis for 
concluding that Rosa was aware of the remarks made by 
Prosterman, and that such remarks prompted her to reassign 
Prosterman to a less favorable assignment. We agree with the 
Division that the charging party has the burden of 
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
individual allegedly discriminated against was engaged in 
protected activity, that the protected activity was known to 
the respondent, and that adverse action would not have been 
taken but for the protected activity. It is not the burden 
of the respondent to disprove, at the outset, knowledge of 
Board - U-9257 -4 
') 
the protected activity or any of the other elements of the 
charging party's prima facie case. In the instant case, 
however logical it might be to assume that Rosa was informed 
of the events of the October 7, 1986 meeting by her 
-- ~ei3lL-lre"ag*Ke^ —whro— 
Prosterman's statements at the meeting remains an assumption 
upon which we may not rely. 
1/2/ 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant that portion of the 
Division's exceptions which asserts that the ALJ improperly 
relied upon a failure to disclaim knowledge of the events of 
the October 7 meeting by Rosa in support of a determination 
that Rosa was aware of the events which transpired at that 
) 
meeting. 
Having so found, we must now determine whether, 
notwithstanding the absence of evidence that Rosa knew about 
-i/The only testimony on the issue of Rosa's possible 
knowledge of Prosterman's statements at the October 7 meeting 
is that the management team, of which Rosa is a member, 
"sometimes" discussed agenda items in advance of labor 
management meetings, and the item previously discussed by 
Prosterman in Rosa•s presence at the May 13 meeting was again 
on the agenda for the October 7 meeting; and that Rosa had 
discussion with Christine Abate, the Division's Executive 
Deputy Commissioner, concerning Prosterman's reassignment and 
Abate was present at the October 7 meeting. There is, 
however, no evidence that the agenda for the October 7 
meeting was discussed, or that Abate and Rosa discussed the 
events of the October 7 meeting when they discussed 
Prosterman's reassignment. 
^/citv of Corning, 17 PERB 13022 (1984), conf'd, 116 
A.D.2d 1042, 19 PERB ^7004 (4th Dep't 1986). 
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Prosterman's conduct at the October 7, 1986 labor management 
committee meeting, the finding that her reassignment of 
Prosterman on October 14, 1986 was in retaliation for 
Prosterman's participation in protected activities is 
- supported.=byjr=the=r-eeor:dr. — 
protected activity engaged in by Prosterman, which had been 
established to have been known by Rosa, consists of 
Prosterman's comments at the May 13, 1986 labor management 
meeting, her long-standing leadership status within PEF, and 
one or more conversations between Rosa and Prosterman 
concerning the attorney career ladder subsequent to the 
May 13 meeting. There is no independent evidence of anti-
union animus, expression of anger toward Prosterman by Rosa 
for her remarks, or other affirmative evidence that Rosa 
considered Prosterman's protected activity in selecting her 
for reassignment. The ALJ did, however, find Rosa's 
explanation of the need to reassign Prosterman to be 
unsupported, not credible, and therefore pretextual. 
It is our determination that, even without regard to 
Prosterman's activities of October 7, 1986, the ALJ was 
•^The only other activity engaged in by Prosterman in 
close temporal proximity to the October 14 reassignment is 
her participation in the handling of a particular grievance 
in late September. However, the ALT found, and the finding 
is not a matter of exceptions before us, that there was no 
evidence introduced to establish that Rosa was aware of 
Prosterman's participation in that particular protected 
activity at the time the reassignment decision was made, and 
we accordingly do not consider it. 
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entitled to make credibility determinations that Prosterman 
was engaged in protected activity known to the Division 
representative responsible for making the reassignment, that 
the reassignment was indeed one generally perceived as less 
advantageousr^and/rrrthat^th^ 
selection of Prosterman for reassignment was pretextual. 
Based upon these determinations, the ALT concluded that the 
reassignment would not have taken place but for the protected 
activity, and was therefore in violation of §§2 09-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Act. We find no basis upon which such credibility 
determinations should be disturbed and the ALJ decision is 
accordingly affirmed. We have reviewed the remaining 
exceptions of the Division and, except to the extent granted 
herein, they are denied. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Division: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, 
coercing or discriminating against unit employees for 
the exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
2. Immediately offer to reassign^/ Prosterman to the 
Appeals and Litigation unit; and 
4/This order permits Prosterman, at her discretion, to 
accept or reject the offer. 
) 
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3. Post notice in the form attached in all locations 
within the Division at which notices of information to 
unit employees are customarily posted. 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
i\j>*Uc- ?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
^EUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a H employees of the State of New York (Division of 
Human Rights) in the unit represented by the Public Employees 
Federation, AFL-CTO, that the State: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain, 
coerce or discriminate against unit employees 
for the exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
and 
2. Will immediately offer Rosamond 
Posterman a reassignment from the Division's 
Administrative Hearings Unit to its Appeals and 
Litigation Unit. 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS) 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9552 
BROOKHAVEN-COMSEWOGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BARBARA D'ADDARIO and MARLENE MERKEL, 
Intervenors. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (PAMELA NORRIX-TURNER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BLOCK, AMELKIN & HAMBURGER, ESQS. (RICHARD HAMBURGER, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
PELLETREAU & PELLETREAU, ESQS. (KEVIN A. SEAMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Intervenors 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School District 
(District) excepts to an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
decision which finds, as alleged by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA), that the District violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally granted stipends to bargaining unit members and 
Case No. U-9552 -2 
1^ which directs, among other things, recoupment of stipends 
already paid to unit members. 
Of 15 employees offered stipends by the District, 
7 accepted and 8 refused to accept the stipends. Two of the 
employees (D'Addario and Merkel), who accepted stipends and 
who are thus affected by the recoupment order, have moved to 
intervene in the proceeding before us. Their motion for 
intervention not only asks us to reject the portion of the 
ALJ's recommended order which directs recoupment, but also 
seeks reversal of the finding of a violation of the Act by 
the District upon the ground that the District had awarded 
stipends in conformity with its past practice and/or that 
CSEA waived its right to negotiate concerning the payment of 
) 
stipends to bargaining unit members, so that no unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of employment was established. 
The District raised and argued both of these defenses to the 
charge throughout the proceedings before the ALT and has 
raised them before us. 
The motion papers and responses thereto adequately 
establish that the proposed intervenors were apprised of the 
filing and processing of the instant improper practice 
charge, and in fact voted at a general membership meeting on 
a proposal in settlement of the charge, prior to the time 
that the hearing was concluded on the merits of the charge, 
August 9, 1988. Therefore, the proposed intervenors had the 
opportunity to seek intervention in the proceedings before 
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the ALT, and elected not to do so. The motion for 
intervention on the merits of the charge is now untimely. 1/ 
In any event, it is our determination that the proposed 
intervenors in the instant charge are not proper parties to 
the determination of its merits. The charge alleges, in 
essence, a violation by the District of CSEA's rights of 
representation and negotiation. Individual bargaining unit 
members, as we have previously held, do not have standing to 
either make or defend such a charge. 
We do, however, find that limited intervention on the 
issue of remedy only is appropriate in this case. This is 
so because, as pointed out by the District and the proposed 
intervenors, recoupment was not requested by CSEA until its 
submission of its post-hearing brief, and the proposed 
intervenors are directly affected by the recommended order of 
recoupment. Based upon the foregoing, the motion of 
D'Addario and Merkel to intervene is granted on the issue of 
remedy only. 
In support of its exceptions, the District asserts that 
CSEA waived its right to negotiate concerning payment of 
salary stipends by agreeing to contract language which 
prohibits the diminution of benefits granted by the District. 
It further contends that a past practice of unilaterally 
granting stipends to bargaining unit members was established, 
i/see §§200.5 and 204.5 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
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) so that no unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment took place. As pointed out by the ALJ, however, 
waiver of the right to negotiate must be established by "the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right with both 
knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish 
it."2/ We agree with the finding of the ALJ that the cited 
contract language prohibiting diminution of salary and other 
benefits cannot be fairly read to grant to the District the 
right to issue salary increases. Furthermore, we find that 
the ALJ correctly determined that the District's 
presentation of two instances in which salary stipends were 
issued by the District fails to establish the existence of a 
past practice permitting the payment of stipends in the 
instant case. We so find because the evidence establishes 
that in both examples presented by the District, the stipends 
were paid as a result of negotiations with CSEA. The 
District thus failed to meet its burden of establishing the 
existence of a past practice of granting unilateral pay 
increases. The finding of violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (d) 
of the Act is, accordingly, affirmed. 
We now turn to the issue of remedial relief. Having 
found that the District violated the Act by making payments 
to certain bargaining unit members in derogation of CSEA's 
^/city of New York v. State of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 659, 
669, cited in CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB f7011 
(3d Dep't 1982). 
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I "") bargaining rights, it is appropriate to restore the parties 
to the positions in which they would have been but for the 
statutory violation. While we consider recoupment of monies 
improperly paid to bargaining unit members to be an unusual 
remedy causing some hardship to affected bargaining unit 
members, we find that recoupment is appropriate in this case 
for the following reasons. First, the District was well 
aware of the opposition of CSEA, based upon a vote taken of 
its general membership to the payment of stipends to 
selected employees before it made the decision to issue the 
stipends. Second, the affected employees were also aware of 
CSEA's position that the unilateral payment of the stipends 
would constitute a violation of the Act and would be subject 
to an improper practice charge, before they accepted the 
stipends. Indeed, 8 of the 15 employees offered stipends 
over CSEA's opposition declined to accept them, apparently 
for that reason. The employees accepting the stipends 
accordingly did so with the knowledge that CSEA believed them 
to be improper, and was considering legal action to oppose 
them. Third, an order directing the District to pay a 
stipend to all bargaining unit members egual to the stipends 
paid to certain members would be inappropriate in this case, 
given the large number of employees and the size of the 
stipends (which ranged from $1,500 to $3,000 each). Finally, 
the District's authorization and payment of the stipends 
directly in the face of notification by CSEA of its decision 
Case No. U-9552 
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) not to consent to the stipends as proposed, compels us to 
conclude that allowing those unit members who elected to 
receive the stipends to keep them, over CSEA's request for 
recoupment,-2/ would so seriously undermine its bargaining 
position as to negate the effect of our finding that a 
violation of the Act occurred. Failure to direct recoupment 
under these circumstances would also seriously and adversely 
affect those employees who were offered stipends and declined 
them in what may be inferred to be a gesture of CSEA 
support. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALT decision is affirmed 
in its entirety. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally granting salary 
stipends to employees within the CSEA bargaining 
unit; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with its 
employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Act; 
3/0n due process grounds, the District and intervenors 
assert that CSEA's failure to request recoupment until 
submission of its post-hearing brief should bar it from doing 
so now. The AKJ's decision and recommended order (Rules, 
§204.9) to which the District and intervenors have had an 
opportunity to respond and whose responses we have 
considered before accepting the ALJ's recommendation does not 
limit the Board or preclude it from taking "such affirmative 
action as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]" (Act, 
§205.5(d), Rules §204.14(c)). Due process requirements have 
been met. 
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3. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA regarding the 
terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees; 
4. Return to the status quo ante which contemplates 
the District's recoupment of all salary stipends it 
was found to have improperly granted; recoupment 
shall be accomplished by deducting not more than 
10% of the affected employees' wages per pay 
period, unless an alternate schedule of repayment 
is agreed to by CSEA; and 
Post the attached notice in all locations normally 
used to communicate with employees in CSEA's 
bargaining unit. 
DATED: June 7, 1989 
Albany, New York 
T&ttlT/ 
H a r o l d R. N< old R. Newman, Chairman 
*«-. z Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
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PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In ord»r to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that the 
Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School District:. 
1. Will not unilaterally grant salary stipends to employees 
within the CSEA bargaining unit; 
2. Will not interfere with its employees in the exercise of 
their rights guaranteed by Article 14 of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act; 
3. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA regarding the terms 
and conditions of employment of unit employees; and 
4. Will return to the status quo ante which contemplates the 
District's recoupment of all salary stipends it was found to have 
improperly granted; recoupment shall be accomplished by deducting 
not more than 10% of the affected employees* wages per pay period, 
unless an alternate schedule of repayment is agreed to by CSEA. 
BROOKHAVEN-COMSEWOGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. (R»pr»»nt»llvd) (Till.) 
This Notice must remain posted tor 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altera* 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ARLINGTON HOURLY TEACHING ASSISTANT 
ASSOCIATION, 
•--^-^=:^—•-•.__-__^r-__ —:•___ —::_ Petitioner, 
-and-
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Arlington Hourly Teaching 
Assistant Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All elementary and secondary hourly teaching 
assistants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-3513 
Certification - C-3513 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Arlington Hourly Teaching 
Assistant Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
-eon-f er~in-" good-^ 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: June 7, 1989 
Albany, New York 
